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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
DEATH-DEATH OF SOLE NEXT OF KIN WILL NOT ABATE A PENDING
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION-WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION Is A PROPERTY RIGHT
UNDER SURVIVAL STATUTE OF ILLINOIS.-The Illinois Supreme Court, in Mc-
Daniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966), was again con-
fronted with the question of whether the death of the sole next of kin
would abate a pending wrongful death action' or whether the sole next of
kin's estate would be entitled to prosecute her claim under the Survival
Statue.2 The Supreme Court, by Chief Justice Klingbiel, held that the death
of the next of kin would not abate the pending wrongful death action but
that the wrongful death action would survive as a property right under the
Survival Statute.
A wrongful death action was originally brought on behalf of the minor
child, Yvonne Ann McDaniel, for the death of her parents and sister killed
in an automobile collision. Before the case could be tried, Yvonne died
from causes unrelated to the deaths of the other members of her family.
The defendants thereupon moved for dismissal on grounds that her death
left no next of kin entitled to relief under the wrongful death action. Dis-
missal was granted and the plaintiffs, administrators of the estate of
Yvonne's parents and sister, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of
Illinois. They contended that if the Wrongful Death Statute and the Sur-
vival Statute were construed as to bar their cause of action, there would be
a denial of a remedy for a wrong, contrary to § 19 of article II of the Illi-
nois Constitution, and there would be a denial of their right of equal pro-
tection under the law.S In reversing the decision of the Circuit Court of
Sangamon County, the court overruled an earlier Illinois decision 4 and held
that the wrongful death action did not abate but became a property right
of the sole next of kin's estate.
Historically, at common law, the survival of tort actions was unknown.
The general rule of the common law that ex delicto actions abated on the
death of either party was modified by the statute of 4 Edward III, ch. 7,
which was construed to permit actions for the loss, damage or conversion
of personal property to survive to the personal representative of the de-
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, § 2 (1963). The pertinent part of this statute is herein cited:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal
representatives of such deceased and . . . the amount recovered in every such
action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and nxt of kin.
2 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 339 (1963). The pertinent part of this statute is herein cited:
In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following
also survive: . . . actions to rccover damages for an injury to real or personal
property....
3 Under § 5 of article IV of the Illinois Constitution, a constitutional issue may
be appealed directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right.
4 Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 111. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
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ceased. This statute became a part of our common law and was enlarged
upon by both the Wrongful Death Statute and the Survival Statute.5
The Illinois courts, in construing the Wrongful Death Statute, have
stated that if there is no surviving spouse or next of kin there can be no
recovery for the benefit of anyone. 6 However, what happens-as in the Mc-
Daniel case-when the next of kin survives for a short period? Does not her
right of action become vested? In Union Steamboat Co. v. Chaffin's Adm'rs,7
a federal court interpreting Illinois law held that a right of action for
wrongful death accrued immediately upon that death, hence becoming an
asset of the next of kin and the right of action was not affected by the next
of kin's subsequent death.
However, the later case of Wilcox v. Bierd8 tended to generate a con-
flict in law. Without citing Union Steamboat Co. v. Chaffin's Adm'rs, the
court in the Wilcox case stated, "The Survival Act does not provide for the
survival or further continuance of the action in case of the death of the
sole next of kin,"9 as the Survival Act only applies to tangible property.
One writer in an earlier edition of this law review speculated as to the rea-
son for this decision:
It is worthy of notice that since the infant lived only thirty
minutes longer than the decedent, the pecuniary loss suffered was
negligible so the court, for practical reasons, may have decided to
disallow the claim rather than award nominal damages.10
The plaintiffs in the instant case argued for a reversal of the Wilcox
decision. In their brief,'" it was urged that "the great weight of authority
and the broader, more liberal view in our country is to the effect that where
a suit for wrongful death is pending, subsequent death of all surviving next
of kin of the decedent will not abate the pending action." The plaintiffs
cited as their principal authority Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co. 12 Justice
Cardozo, in holding for the plaintiff in that case, declared:
When we remember that under the death statutes, an inde-
pendent cause of action is created in favor of the beneficiaries for
5 For a fuller discussion of the history of wrongful death and survival statutes, see
Prosser, Torts § 120 (1964).
6 McDavid v. Ficar, 342 II1. App. 673, 97 N.E.2d 587 (3d Dist. 1951); Polion v. State,
5 I11. Ct. Cl. 353 (1927). The conclusion reached by these cases is not conclusively true,
as the Wrongful Death Statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, § 2 (1963), provides recovery for
persons furnishing hospitalization and medical services and to the personal representative
for administering the estate, even if there is no next of kin.
7 204 Fed. 412 (7th Cir. 1913), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 620, 33 Sup. Ct. 778 (1913).
8 330 I1. 571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
9 Id. at 585, 162 N.E.2d at 170.
10 32 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 325, 329 (1954).
11 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 14.
12 300 U.S. 342, 57 Sup. Ct. 452 (1936). For an inclusive examination of other juris-
dictions, see annotations in 13 A.L.R. 225 (1921), as supplemented by 34 A.L.R. 162
(1925) and 59 A.L.R. 760 (1929).
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their pecuniary damages, the conclusion is not difficult that the
cause of action once accrued is not divested or extinguished by
the death of one or more of the beneficiaries thereafter, but sur-
vives, like a cause of action for injury to a property right .... 13
The court in the McDaniel case overruled Wilcox and held that a
wrongful death action is a property right of the sole next of kin's estate.
In the Wilcox case, a narrow construction had been given to the words
"personal property" as used in the Illinois Survival Statute.' 4 The court in
the Wilcox case had concluded:
It is not a suit to recover damages to personal property or to
real estate within the meaning of the Survival Act, but is a suit to
recover for a loss of increase in money value to the estate of the
deceased. . . . It may be said to be a suit for recovery of damage
or loss to property right in the most general sense, but it is not a
suit to recover loss to personal or real property ... 15
In the McDaniel case, the court refused to give such a narrow technical
construction to the term "property." In sustaining the more general con-
struction, the court relied on Hunt v. Ruthier.16 In that case, decedent was
killed deliberately by one Emphrem Mounsey, who thereafter took his own
life. The plaintiffs were the surviving heirs of the decedent. They filed an
action for waste and destruction of their property under the California Sur-
vival Statute. 17 The case turned on the meaning of the word "property."
That court stated:
.... [P]roperty is a generic term and its meaning in any case must
be determined by ascertaining the sense in which it is used. When
unqualified, the term is sufficiently comprehensive to include every
species of the estate.18
In declaring that tort actions are a part of the property of an estate, the
California court quoted Professor Prosser to the effect that ". . . . The mod-
ern trend is definitely toward the view that tort causes of action and lia-
bilities are.., a part of the estate of either the plaintiff or defendant ... "19
The Illinois Supreme Court, after summarizing the rules of the Hunt
case, spoke of the inapplicability of abatement in circumstances as lie in the
McDaniel case ....... [T]he doctrine of abatement would place a premium
on delaying tactics on the part of the defendants ... who would be relieved
of all liability if the case should be prolonged long enough."'
's 300 U.S. at 349, 57 Sup. Ct. at 455 (emphasis added).
14 See pertinent parts of Wrongful Death Statute, supra note 1, and Survival Statute,
supra note 2.
15 Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 III. 571, 586, 162 N.E. 170, 176-77 (1928).
16 28 Cal. 2d 288, 169 P.2d 913 (1946).
17 Cal. Prob. C.A. Div. III, ch. 8, § 574 (1959).
18 Hunt v. Ruthier, supra note 16, at 295, 169 P.2d at 917.
19 Id. at 294, 169 P.2d at 916.
20 McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 Ill. 2d 487, 492, 216 N.E.2d 140, 143 (1966). Justice Wey-
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The position taken by the Illinois Supreme Court that the wrongful
death action does not abate on the death of the sole next of kin would ap-
pear to be in accord with the history and development of tort law. At early
common law, a tort action was regarded as punitive in character and retal-
iatory in nature; no action would lie if the victim was dead, as there would
no longer be anyone to punish the wrongdoer. However, with time, the
purpose of granting damages for tortious conduct became to compensate
the victim rather than to punish the wrongdoer, and the courts began to
hold that the estate of an individual should not be depleted because of the
wrong of another. The trend of allowing compensation for the victims of
tortious conduct is reflected in the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court
in the instant case.
There is one dissent in the McDaniel case. Justice Underwood dis-
sented on the grounds of stare decisis. He agreed with the majority in prin-
ciple but disagreed with the decision, feeling the Illinois law was settled by
Wilcox v. Bierd, and any change in the law should be left to the legislature.
What is the impact of the McDaniel decision upon the law? First, it
places Illinois in step With the majority of decisions of this type. Second, it
clearly widens the construction given to the Survival Statute in Illinois and
in doing so corrects a wrong. The estate which must bear expense for the
support of the next of kin may now be reimbursed. Lastly, the McDaniel
decision suggests that the Supreme Court will be willing to overstep the
bounds of stare decisis21 when it believes a change in the law and common
justice call for it.
GERALD J. SMOLLER
RELEASE--CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-COVENANT NOT TO SUE-
COVENANT NOT TO SUE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF SERVANT EXTINGUISHES MAS-
TER'S LIABILITY WHEN BASIS FOR LIABILITY OF MASTER Is DOCTRINE OF RFS-
PONDEAT SUPERIOR.-In the case of Holcomb v. Flavin, 34 Ill. 2d 558, 216
N.E.2d 811 (1966), the Supreme Court of Illinois was asked to decide
whether the-execution of covenant not to sue the servant extinguished the
liability of the master. The court held that when the basis of liability is
gardt better states this proposition in his minority opinion in Danis v. New York Cent. Ry.,
160 Ohio St. 474, 478, 117 N.E.2d 39, 41 (1954). He declared:
[T]here is no more effective method for defeating justice than simply to
delay it.
Justice Cardozo, in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350, 57 Sup. Ct. 452,
456 (1936), discussed the ills of abatement by stating:
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the
law... . It would be a misfortune if a narrow or guilding process of construc-
tion were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied.
21 It appears that the only reason the court held against the plaintiff in Danis v.
New York Cent. Ry., supra note 20, a case with a similar question to the McDaniel
case, was on the grounds of stare decisis. The court stated that if the case had been
one of first impression, it would have held otherwise.
